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Abstract 
Based on powerful survey data from an international oil company in Norway, we 
explore perceptions of performance appraisal and career opportunities among leaders 
and employees. Perceptions indicate that performance and payoff is better balanced 
among women than among men. Moreover, the connection between perceived 
achievement and appreciation is strengthened by time of service for leaders, but not for 
employees in non-managerial positions. Finally, perceptions of performance appraisal 
and career opportunities depend on characteristics of the local work environment, with 
positive influence from key phenomena like change capability, competency focus, trust 
and identity.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The role of human capital, competence and people issues is ascending on the strategic 
agenda of both public and private enterprise. On the back of a period with heavy focus 
on capital efficiency, asset values and shareholder returns, managers of private 
corporations and public organisations now seem to augment their approach through an 
upgrade of issues relating to human capital management. The path-breaking 
development of new technologies is no longer limited to the technology, media and 
telecom industries. Rather, new innovations have made their way into virtually all 
sectors of the modern economy. People and competence are crucial for the productivity 
of these technologies, and therefore also for the performance of public enterprise, and 
for the competitiveness of private companies. Strong economic growth has also led to 
capacity pressures in large parts of the OECD area, not least in the labour market. High-
skill labour is an increasingly scarce input for competitive firms and organisations. 
Consequently, strategic issues of human capital management have gained strength 
throughout the economy.  
 
Performance appraisal has become increasingly important in this respect. The key idea 
is to establish a reward system that optimizes the efforts and contribution of leaders and 
employees to the general performance of their organisation. As noted by Cleveland, 
Murphy, and William (1989), the propagation of performance appraisal systems is 
motivated by a broad range of concerns, including promotions, terminations, salary 
administration, and the development of adequate competence and expertise. 
Performance appraisal may be useful both in the cross-sectional dimension (for 
comparison between individuals) and for the time dimension (for comparison of 
individual performance over time).  
 
There is a large body of research on performance appraisal systems. The early literature 
was dominated by psychologists, and focused on the psychometric properties of 
appraisal, in particular the role of supervisors and the precision on their performance 
evaluation (see Milkovich and Wigor, 1991, for a survey) Recent psychological 
literature has put more emphasis on worker reaction to appraisals, and the social 
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context in which appraisal occurs (see Keeping and Levy, 2000; Levy and Williams, 
2004). Issues of employee satisfaction with performance appraisal systems are explored 
by Boswell and Benson (2000) and Brown and Benson (2003), both arguing that 
individual involvement and development opportunities play an important role for the 
success ratio of performance appraisal systems. Kuvaas (2006) investigates the 
relationships between performance appraisal on the one hand, and employee outcomes 
in terms of performance, organisational commitment and turnover intention on the 
other. He finds that motivational issues play an important role for the efficiency of 
performance appraisal systems. The role of trust for the acceptance of performance 
appraisal has also caught extensive attention in recent research (e.g., Zaheer, McEvily 
and Perrone, 1998; Reinke, 2003; Kickul, Gundry, and Posig, 2005). Results from these 
studies clearly suggest that the level of trust between employee and leader is an 
important predictor for the general acceptance and advancement of performance 
appraisal systems. 
 
Economists started to gain a theoretical interest in performance appraisal in the 1970s 
when economics of incentives and asymmetric information made its way into the 
theoretical literature. However, it is not until recently that economists have begun to 
investigate performance appraisal empirically. Some studies focus on the productivity-
effect of performance pay (see e.g. Lazear 2000), while other recent papers study the 
individual and job-based determinants of performance appraisals. Key findings from 
this literature indicate a wider dispersion of labour income due to performance 
appraisal, both within each firm (Barth et al., 2008), and for society as a whole 
(Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent, 2007). Grund and Sliwka (2007) argue that the 
prevalence of performance appraisal correlates negatively with risk aversion, which 
again is an increasing function of age, and which is more pronounced among women. 
Consequently, performance appraisal systems are most common among young and 
middle-aged men. Yet, there is still a surprisingly little empirical research on the link 
between performance appraisal and this kind of background variables.  
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Based on a unique and powerful set of survey data from a large international oil 
company, we explore perceptions of performance appraisal and career opportunities 
among leaders and their employees. Our measure of performance appraisal includes 
elements of reward and recognition, and might be seen as a backward-looking 
indicator. On the other hand, individual perceptions and judgments regarding career 
opportunities may be seen as a forward-looking measure of performance appraisal (e.g., 
Prendergast, 1999). Accordingly, we estimate and present econometric models for both 
these perspectives.  
 
We present a case study, rather than a broad economy-wide cross-sectional assessment 
(e.g., Grund and Sliwka, 2007). One advantage with case studies is that we to some 
extent control for sorting effects, since the employees of our data set to a large extent 
are exposed to common organizational changes and business cycles (e.g. Lazear, 1998; 
Marsden, 2004). We combine knowledge of the formal appraisal system that the 
employees are exposed to, with their subjective perception of performance appraisal. 
The employees are asked to what extent performance forms the basis for recognition 
and reward, and the answers on this question is our dependent variables in the 
econometric analysis.  This is important since formal appraisal systems such as bonus 
contracts, commissions and piece rates are just a small part of total performance 
appraisal.  Performance-related reward, for instance, is often based on supervisors’ 
subjective evaluation (see MacLeod, 2003 for analysis), and these evaluations are not 
captured in empirical studies of formal incentive systems. 
 
Our main results are as follows: First, the perceived alignment of efforts and rewards is 
more pronounced among women than for men. This result is in contrast to findings in 
cross-sectional studies where women “sort” into jobs with lower degree of performance 
appraisal (e.g. Barth et al. 2008; Grund and Sliwka, 2007). An implication may be that 
women have a steeper wage curve than men in this particular company, but to our 
knowledge, there is no systematic favouring of women. A more plausible explanation is 
that women have different references and information bases than men (e.g., Hind and 
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Baruch, 1997). A given relationship between performance and reward may thus be 
perceived as gratifying among women, but not necessarily among men. 
 
Second, we find that the connection between perceived achievement and appreciation is 
strengthened by time of service for leaders, but not for employees in non-managerial 
positions. The longer an employee has worked in the company, the weaker relationship 
he/she finds between performance and recognition/reward. This is in line with previous 
studies, arguing that employees are more likely to be evaluated and appraised in the 
beginning of their career (Brown and Heywood, 2005). A theoretical explanation for 
this finding is that evaluation and monitoring is more important early in a worker’s 
career for the purposes of determining ability and job assignment (Jovanovic, 1979; 
Lazear, 1990). Moreover, senior workers are more likely to have developed firm 
specific human capital, which reduces the need for monitoring since the chance that 
other firms will pay them more is smaller (Lazear, 1998). For leaders, on the other 
hand, we find that the balance between perceived achievement and appreciation is 
improving with length of service. A likely explanation is that leaders (more often then 
regular employees) are exposed to formal incentive schemes based on individual 
performance, and that these schemes are not affected by seniority. Moreover, seniority 
may increase the indispensability of the leaders’ human capital, and as shown by 
Kvaløy and Olsen (2007), indispensable human capital calls for individual performance 
pay, since employees can threaten to walk away if they are not paid a “fair share” of 
their value-added.   
 
Third, we find that perceived performance appraisal and career opportunities are linked 
to characteristics of the local work environment. Our results suggest that efforts and 
rewards are more balanced in parts of the organisation characterised by high 
willingness and capability to change, attributes which correlate negatively with risk 
aversion. On the other hand, perceived career opportunities seem to be dampened by 
change capability both for leaders and their employees. Units and departments focusing 
on active management of skills and expertise are associated with higher scores for both 
performance appraisal and career opportunities. Not surprisingly, we also find that trust 
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and identity plays an important role for perceptions of performance appraisal and career 
opportunities. Finally, concerns for health, safety and environmental (HSE) issues exert 
a negative influence on the balance between efforts and rewards, whereas perceived 
career opportunities are positively influenced by local HSE concerns. 
 
Any imbalance between perceived individual efforts on the one hand, and reward and 
recognition may be seen as a breach of procedural fairness (e.g., Konovsky, 2000; 
Brown and Benson, 2003), and will act as a potential disturbance for both job 
motivation and individual performance (e.g., Winstanley and Smith, 1996). The interest 
of managers should therefore be to secure alignment of expectations and realisations, 
and management resources should be allocated accordingly. Our results provide useful 
input to this important balancing act. First, this study suggests that the alignment of 
performance and rewards may be somewhat more of a challenge among men then 
among women. Our results are supportive of systematic gender variation in perceptions 
on performance appraisal both among leaders and employees in non-managerial 
positions. Second, senior people report a larger gap between individual efforts and 
rewards than young and newly employed people, especially for employees in non-
managerial positions. Third, the perceived balance of the performance appraisal system 
is clearly influenced by characteristics and properties in the local work environment, 
like change capability, competency focus, trust and identity issues. This kind of results 
could be applied to rank the requirements of various parts of the organisation with 
respect to management attention and corrective measures. 
 
Finally, our results demonstrate that the mechanics of backward-looking performance 
appraisal (reward and recognition) is not necessarily identical to the formation of 
expectations with respect to future performance appraisal (career opportunities). As an 
example, this study demonstrates that an agile working environment, with capacity and 
capabilities for change, is usually accompanied by gratifying systems in terms of 
backward-looking performance appraisal. On the other hand, exactly the same 
properties correlate negatively with perceptions regarding career opportunities among 
the leaders of our study. 
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The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the processes of 
performance appraisal in the company which forms the subject of our case study. The 
data set is presented and variables are defined and discussed in Section 3. An 
econometric model is outlined and estimated in Section 4, with subsequent discussion 
of key results. Concluding remarks are offered in Section 5. 
 
2. Performance appraisal in Statoil 
 
Statoil is an international oil and gas company with 25,000 employees and business 
activities in 34 countries. As the former national oil company of Norway, Statoil was 
established in 1972 to take part in the development of oil and gas resources on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf. Over the years, gradual commercialisation, deregulation 
and internationalisation culminated with the partial privatisation and listing of the 
company in June 2001. Statoil merged with Hydro’s oil and gas activities in October 
2007, and currently ranks among the 10 largest international oil and gas companies in 
the OECD area. As a former national oil company in a Nordic social democracy, 
Statoil’s policies of reward and remuneration seek to balance a broad range of 
objectives and concerns.2 
 
Statoil advertise a reward concept that includes both intangible benefits such as 
professional development and more tangible rewards such as a employment benefits 
dependant upon position, role and in some cases, geographic location. Appraisals of 
individual performance are claimed to be based not only on specific delivery, but also 
on social behaviour. As a part of the corporate management system, a designated 
process (“People@Statoil”) is run on an annual cycle to manage people, performance, 
development and deployment. Goals relating to individual performance and behaviour 
are linked to strategic objectives, which also set the direction for personal development 
and career plans. 
 
 6
SNF Working Paper No 07/09 
Reward packages are designed to be competitive in relevant market segments and 
regions where the company operates, and include bonus and share savings schemes in 
addition to base salary and other compensations. In their recruitment documents, the 
company also puts weight on welfare, wellbeing, continuous competence upgrades, and 
a large internal job market. Pension plans and insurance arrangements, sick leave, 
flexible work arrangements and paid holiday may also be seen as parts of the reward 
system. 
 
For leaders as well as employees, individual fixed salaries are claimed to reflect 
responsibilities, experience and competence. Fixed salaries are evaluated in a yearly 
process of performance appraisal, with follow-up meetings between superiors and 
subordinates throughout the year. In this process, equal weight is put on individual 
deliveries and personal behaviour. All employees are included in a corporate group 
bonus programme, with a bonus opportunity limited to 5 per cent of the annual fixed 
salary (2006). The corporate bonus is calculated yearly, based on financial performance 
relative to other large international oil and gas companies.  
 
A selection of executives in key specialist and administrative positions are included in 
an annual variable pay scheme, as well as a long-term incentive scheme, whereby 
bonus entitlements are accumulated on a rolling 3-year basis. Leaders are subject to a 
yearly 360 degree evaluation process, with inputs and assessments also from colleagues 
in other parts of the company (e.g., supplying units and client units).  
 
3. Data and variables 
 
Our data source is the annual survey of the work environment and organisational 
issues in Statoil. This so-called Global People Survey was undertaken in the period 
15 September to 27 October 2006, and was sent out to 16,000 leaders and employees 
in 14 European countries. 3 With a response rate of 83 per cent, more than 13,000 
forms were retrieved from the survey. Our sample is the 2006 survey, with just 
above 12,000 responses for the variables we will study. Statoil’s Global People 
 7
SNF Working Paper No 07/09 
Survey 2006 requested the evaluation of 60 questions and statements on a 
measurement scale ranging from 1 to 6. Subjects covered a wide range of topical 
areas, including (but not limited to) performance culture, change capability, 
competence and expertise, trust and identity, and HSE issues. Moreover, the 
response forms offer data for background information on gender, age, seniority, 
leader/non-leader position, country of work and organisational belonging, offering 
information for a wide range of empirical assessments. 
 
The scope of our study is to investigate factors behind perceptions regarding 
performance appraisal and career opportunities. As our performance appraisal 
variable (PA), we therefore select the response given to the following statement: 
 “In my entity, performance forms the basis for recognition and reward.” 
On a scale from 1 to 6, respondents are asked to assess the justification for this 
statement based on his or her personal experience. Observe first that the statement 
invites a genuinely subjective evaluation, without any rigid link to observables or 
measurable phenomena. Neither is it suitable for inference on recognition and 
reward. Rather, the statement addresses the relation between performance on the one 
hand, and recognition and reward on the other. The information which is gained from 
this approach provides insight on the perceived connection between efforts and 
reward. The objective of our statistical analysis is therefore to explore factors that 
may influence the perceived alignment of performance and payoff as implied by 
Statoil’s system of reward and recognition.  
 
As noted by Prendergast (1999), career opportunities may be seen as an option to 
renegotiate the employment contract based on previous performance. This forward-
looking perspective on performance appraisal may also be addressed in our data set. 
Consequently, the point of departure for our second dependent variable is therefore a 
statement concerning individual career opportunities (CO). The statement in question 
reads: 
“I am satisfied with my career opportunities in Statoil.” 
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The perceived correctness of this statement is also ranked on a scale from 1 to 6. 
Observe again that the question is subject to a strictly subjective evaluation, and that 
no specific measures are included or implied, neither for career opportunities nor for 
the degree of content. As such, the statement simply evaluates the sentiment in each 
respondent, to produce a simple indicator of general complacency with respect to 
career opportunities.  
 
Figure 1. Average scores from Statoil’s Global People Survey 2006 
Performance Appraisal
(perception)
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
All Women Men 
Full sample Leaders Employees
Career opportunities
(perception)
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
All Women Men 
Full sample Leaders Employees
 
Source: StatoilHydro. 
 
Average scores for the variables we will explain are illustrated in Figure 1. Ratings 
among leaders are somewhat higher than among employees for both variables. The 
same is true for women. For the system of performance appraisal, the gap between 
leaders and employees is significant. Appraisal systems in terms of individual 
performance pay and bonuses are more advanced for leaders than for employees, 
whose economic reward is largely restricted to their annual wage negotiations (in 
addition to social recognition and career opportunities). As we see from the right-
hand panel of Figure 1, a similar pattern is reproduced for the individual perception 
of career opportunities. However, the difference between leaders and employees is 
less pronounced for this variable, and so is the difference between women and men. 
For more details on average scores, see Appendix 1. 
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Our scope of research involves regressions for the two indicators of performance 
appraisal and career opportunities against relevant background variables. Moreover, 
we will seek to establish robust relations between our two dependent variables on the 
one hand, and other elements of Statoil’s Global People Survey on the other. Our 
data set allows a split between men and women, and we will therefore test whether 
perceptions of performance appraisal and career opportunities vary systematically 
across gender. Further, respondents are asked for information on seniority. More 
specifically, they tick one of three boxes to indicate the length of service with the 
firm (less than 3 years, 3-10 years or more than 10 years). In our statistical analyses, 
we apply dummy variables to test for the role of seniority for the perception of 
performance appraisal and career opportunities.  
 
Our data offer lots of additional information that could shed additional light on 
perceptions of performance appraisal and career opportunities. Due to mechanisms 
of self-selection (e.g. Lazear, 1998; Marsden, 2004), we should expect employees in 
a performance-oriented working environment to be more pleased with the system of 
performance appraisal than employees in units where performance and merit is of 
lesser importance. For example, employees within corporate finance and commodity 
trading units should be more inclined to give a high score for performance appraisal 
than employees in blue-collar operational units with high degree of collective 
bargaining (see also Grund and Sliwka, 2006).4 Moreover, employees and 
organisational units marked by general distrust and an unsound working environment 
would think differently about performance appraisal and career opportunities than 
people with trustworthy leaders in a healthy part of the organisation (e.g., Zaheer, 
McEvily and Perrone, 1998; Reinke, 2003; Kickul, Gundry, and Posig, 2005). 
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Table 1. Validation of index variables 
Factor analysis obtained with Stata 9.0 
C b) λ1 α) Items, index variables, and key statistics 
Change capability (CHNG; EV1 = 2.68; EV2 = 0.01; Cronbach’s α = 0.86)    
  CHNG1: “In my entity, we have a culture which stimulates new ideas and creativity” 0.79 0.62 
  CHNG2: “In my entity, we systematically follow up on feedback from customers 
                    and clients” 0.69 0.48 
  CHNG3: “In my entity, we are good at exchanging experiences with other entities  
                    in Statoil” 0.72 0.52 
  CHNG4: “In my entity, suggestions for improvements are quickly put into practice” 0.78 0.61 
  CHNG5: “My superior is good at implementing improvements” 0.68 0.47 
  Expertise (EXPT; EV1 = 3.27; EV2 = 0.06; Cronbach’s α =0.88 ) 
  EXPT1: ”I am able to utilise my expertise and abilities in my daily work”  0.67 0.47 
  EXPT2: “Conditions are favourable for me to continue my personal development  
                   in a systematic manner” 0.84 0.71 
  EXPT3: “I receive the training required to do a good job” 0.73 0.55 
  EXPT4: “I take the initiative and actively seek to develop my skills” 0.65 0.45 
  EXPT5: “In my entity, we are good at making use of each other’s expertise  
                  and experience” 0.80 0.65 
  EXPT6: “My leader creates favourable conditions for the development of each 
                  employee” 0.73 0.54 
Trust and identity (TRID; EV1 = 3.53; EV2 = 0.37; Cronbach’s α = 0.87)   
  TRID1: “I have confidence in the management of my business unit” 0.81 0.68 
  TRID2: “I have confidence in the corporate executive committee” 0.75 0.63 
  TRID3: “I speak of Statoil to my friends as a good company to work for” 0.66 0.47 
  TRID4: “In my entity, we respect the individual” 0.68 0.59 
  TRID5: “In my entity, we may challenge accepted truths” 0.69 0.60 
  TRID6: “Cooperation between management and the trade unions in my business 
                 unit is good” 0.72 0.55 
  TRID7: “I am confident that Statoil contributes to sustainable development and 
                 displays social responsibility wherever it has operations” 0.65 0.48 
HSE consciousness (HSEC; EV1 = 2.27 ; EV2 = 0.15; Cronbach’s α = 0.81)   
  HSEC1: “In my entity, the zero mindset (zero accidents, harm and losses) forms 
                  the basis for planning and implementing our work” 0.66 0.48 
  HSEC2: “In my entity, we are good at exploiting diversity (of backgrounds, age, 
                  gender, and abilities)” 0.71 0.53 
  HSEC3: “In my entity, tasks which could entail risk are always performed 
                  According to established procedures” 0.66 0.48 
  HSEC4: “I get support from my colleagues if I find difficulties in solving my tasks” 0.63 0.40 
  HSEC5: “Tasks in my workplace are organised in accordance with the capabilities 
                  of the individual employee” 0.71 0.53 
   
a) Factor loadings. b) Communality.  Data source: StatoilHydro, Global People Survey 2006. 
 
To grasp this variation in properties and characteristics of the local working 
environment, we design four index variables, based on factor analysis of relevant 
groups of items (see Pett, Lackey, and Sullivan, 2003). An overview of retained 
items, index variables and key statistics is presented in Table 1. We report 
eigenvalues for two potential principal components, EV1 and EV2. A substantial drop 
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is observed between EV1 and EV2 for all index variables. With a maximum for the 
second eigenvalue of 0.37 (TRID), this suggest that our preferred index-variables 
represent a reliable clustering of items. The clustering of items is backed up by high 
factor loadings (λ1), indicating a specific underlying dimension for all our index 
variables. Moreover, the reliability of our index-variables is also supported by high 
internal consistency, as measured by Cronbach’s α (Cronbach, 1951). Finally, values 
above 0.45 for all communality measures (C) indicate a low degree of specific 
variance, implying that each of our index variables is quite well explained by one 
single factor. 
 
The first index variable (CHNG) relates to change capacity in the local work place, 
including items concerning creativity, internal and external follow-up and feedback, 
and implementation of improvement efforts. The underlying hypothesis is that an 
agile working environment, with capacity and capabilities for change, should also 
affect the balance between expectations and fulfilment in terms of performance 
appraisal (e.g., Offstein et al., 2005).  
 
The second index variable (EXPT) evolves around competence and expertise, and 
represents a synthesis of items related to human capacity utilization, development 
and exchange of competence. These qualities of the local work place may be seen as 
a reflection of active HR management (e.g., Lado and Wilson, 1994; Svetlik and 
Stavrou-Costea, 2007), which is potentially important both for the job motivation of 
the individual employee, and for the performance of the organisation. Responders 
who would emphasize the connection between competence and performance should 
tend to cluster in organisational units where this relation is appreciated. The role of 
our EXPT variable is therefore to test if these leaders and employees also feel that 
their inclination for competence and expertise is appropriately rewarded. 
 
Issues of trust have become increasingly important in the literature on organizational 
culture and performance in general (e.g., Kickul et al., 2005), and specifically for the 
acceptance of performance appraisal systems (e.g., Reinke, 2003; Kuvaas, 2006). 
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The third index variable represents a proxy for trust and identity (TRID), based on 
questions and items concerned with confidence in management, as well as issues of 
strategy, collaboration and reputation. As this variable captures trust both in the 
immediate leader as well as corporate management, it covers both the relationship-
based as well as the character-based perspective of trust (e.g., Dirks and Ferrin, 
2002).  
 
The last index variable (HSEC) accounts for the prevalence and importance of 
concerns for health, environment and safety issues in the local organisation of the 
surveyed persons. As evident from the definition presented in Table 1, this variable 
is largely based on internal welfare and safety issues, rather than corporate 
environmental concerns. In contrast with the other index variables, the HSEC 
variable is expected to exert a negative influence on the performance appraisal 
variable, but not necessarily for the perception of career opportunities. Finally, there 
is good reason to believe that all the above mechanisms will vary significantly 
between leaders and non-leaders. For example, long experience with the firm may be 
positive for the acceptance of performance appraisal systems among leaders, as 
leaders belong to a group which is systematically rewarded for performance. On the 
other hand, the group of people with long experience with the firm as an employee 
will include persons who never have succeeded in becoming leaders. For this group, 
seniority might disturb the perceived balance between achievements and 
appreciation. Accordingly, we estimate our model in three versions: one for the full 
sample of respondents, one for the sub-sample of leaders, and one for the sub-sample 
of employees. Descriptive statistics for these three samples are presented in Table 2.  
 
 13
SNF Working Paper No 07/09 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for data sample 
 
Full sample 
( N = 12366 ) 
Leaders 
( N = 1950 )  
Employees 
( N = 10416 )  
 
 Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. 
PA 4.057 1.220 4.511 1.073 3.973 1.227 
CO 4.444 1.172 4.774 1.061 4.384 1.182 
CHNG 4.186 0.871 4.505 0.747 4.128 0.880 
EXPT 4.326 0.856 4.641 0.736 4.269 0.864 
TRID 4.667 0.784 5.017 0.626 4.603 0.842 
HSEC 4.693 0.727 4.923 0.607 4.651 0.739 
 
Data source: StatoilHydro, Global People Survey 2006. 
 
 
4. Econometric model and estimation results 
 
Our econometric is specified to account for the special properties of our data, which 
is based on a set of ordinal information from Statoil’s Global People Survey. 
Specifically, our dependent variables may take any value on an ordinal scale from 1 
to 6, whereas the dummy variables for gender and seniority take either 0 or 1 as their 
value. We know that five is a better response than four, and this information should 
be acknowledged and exploited in our econometric estimation. However, we are not 
in a position to say that the difference between three and four is half the importance 
of the difference between one and three. On the other hand, aggregation has 
transformed the ordinal scale of the constituent variables to a continuous scale for the 
five index variables. Still, the variation of the index variables is restricted to the 
interval [1, 6]. Based on these special properties of our data, we apply a 
generalisation of the probit model for categorical choice, the so-called ordered probit 
model (Zavoina and McElvey, 1975; Greene, 2003). At the core of our model is an 
underlying linear relationship between a latent variable (y*), and a set of explanatory 
variables (x, z): 
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,* ezxy ++= γβ       [1] 
 
where x represents the vector of dummy variables for gender and seniority, z is the 
vector of index variables, β and γ represent the set of coefficients to be estimated, 
and e is an error term with the standard white-noise properties. What we observe, 
however, is not y*, but its ordered approximation (y), with discrete values in the 
interval [1, 6].  With α1, α2, α3, α4, α5 as the relevant set of threshold parameters (or 
cut points), the observed variable is now assumed to satisfy the following definition: 
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The probability of observing y* at a specific value for the recorded response may 
now be stated as: 
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Maximum-likelihood procedures are now applied to estimate the coefficient vectors 
β and γ of Equation [2], along with the threshold parameters α1, . ., α5. The estimated 
coefficients β and γ  measure the change in the average score for the dependent 
variable in response to a one-unit change in dummy variables and explanatory 
variables, respectively.5  
 
Estimation results for perceptions of performance appraisal and career opportunities 
are presented in Tables 3 and 4, respectively.6 The full sample consists of approx. 
12,500 observations in both cases. The sample split between leaders and non-leaders 
leave some 1,950 observations (16 per cent) for the population of leaders, and around 
10,500 observations (84 per cent) for the population of employee respondents. The 
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statistical properties of all econometric models are satisfactory. Estimated parameters 
take signs according to expectations, and most of them pass the tests of statistical 
significance at the 1 per cent level.7 Moreover, all tests for joint significance strongly 
indicate that our explanatory variables are highly valid. Statistical fit, in terms of 
pseudo R2, suggest that our variables capture 18-21 per cent of the variation in the 
data set.8 
 
Our estimated model for the perception of performance appraisal produces a positive 
coefficient for our female gender dummy, indicating that women feel that efforts and 
rewards are more aligned than the perception would suggest for men. The estimated 
gender difference is also exactly twice as large for leaders as for the population of 
employees. This result is in contrast with previous findings for cross-sectional data 
of economy-wide survey information (e.g., Grund and Sliwka, 2007), whereby PA 
systems are found to be more attractive for men than for women. This difference in 
results may be due to the difference in data types, as economy-wide data is more 
sensitive to selection bias. An alternative interpretation is based on Sweeney and 
McFarlin (1997),9 who argue that women are less concerned with distributive justice 
than men. Finally, the systematic discrepancy between women and men in their 
evaluation of the PA system could also reflect different information sets and gender-
specific references (Hind and Baruch, 1997; Donohue and Heywood, 2004). 
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Table 3. Estimated perception of performance appraisal (PA model) 
Ordered probit estimates obtained with Stata 9.0 
 Full sample Leaders Employees 
 Estimated coefficients a) 
Female      0.108
***      0.205*** 
(0.000) (0.001) 
     0.110*** 
(0.000) 
Seniority 1 (3-10 yrs) -0.032  (0.276) 
   0.243** 
(0.021) 
   -0.079*** 
(0.013) 
Seniority 2 (> 10 yrs)    -0.076
*** 
(0.007) 
0.107 
(0.269) 
   -0.128*** 
(0.000) 
CHNG     0.542
*** 
(0.000) 
    0.436*** 
(0.000) 
    0.561*** 
(0.000) 
EXPT     0.418
*** 
(0.000) 
    0.442*** 
(0.000) 
    0.408*** 
(0.000) 
TRID     0.320*** (0.000)     0.405
*** 
(0.000) 
    0.290*** 
(0.000) 
HSEC   -0.074
*** 
(0.001) 
-0.007 
(0.911) 
  -0.079*** 
(0.000) 
 Model diagnostics 
  
  7238.68*** 
       (0.000)
   887.32*** χ2 ( )     (0.000)    6082.17
*** 
       (0.000) 
Pseudo R2      0.19    0.16      0.19 
Obs (#) 12368 1950 10418 
 
*)   Significant at 90, **) 95 and  ***) 99 per cent confidence level, respectively. 
a)   p-values in brackets. 
 
For the full sample, our results suggest that the perceived balance between 
achievements and acknowledgement is skewed by length of service with the 
company. Both dummy variables for seniority are negative and statistically 
significant. The coefficient for Seniority 1 suggests that the perception among people 
who have stayed with the company for 3-10 years is that efforts and rewards are less 
balanced than the perception would suggest among people who have been with the 
company for a shorter period of time. Moreover, the higher value for Seniority 2 than 
for Seniority 1 suggests that people who have stayed with the company for more than 
10 years feel that the link between performance and recognition is even weaker than 
for people with intermediate length of service. This result is consistent with previous 
empirical findings which imply that preferences for merit-based pay are negatively 
related to years of service (e.g., Koys, Keaveny, and Allen, 1989). At the same time, 
these results are clearly driven by attitudes among employees in non-managerial 
positions, who represent 84 per cent of the full sample. The negative relation 
between performance appraisal acceptance and length of service is not reproduced 
for the sub-sample of leaders. In line with findings by Taylor, Masterson, Renard, 
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and Tracy (1998), our estimated model for the sub-sample of leaders suggests that 
the perceived connection between achievements and appreciation is stronger for 
managers and employees who benefit most from the prevailing PA system.  
 
Our results suggest that the perceived balance between individual achievement and 
acknowledgements is higher in parts of the organisation characterised by high 
willingness and capability to change. We therefore find support for the hypothesis 
that an agile working environment, with focus on competitiveness and change is 
normally associated with a more direct link between individual performance and 
rewards than what is typical for more lenient and sheltered parts of the organisation 
(e.g., Offstein et al., 2005). 
 
As we would expect, units and departments focusing on active management of skills 
and expertise (EXPT) are also associated with higher scores for the approval with 
performance appraisal systems. In this respect, there is only a slight difference 
between leaders and employees. Individuals who are especially concerned with the 
kind of qualities represented by the EXPT variable, may seek job opportunities on 
that account. With this interpretation, our results suggest that they feel that their 
qualities and interests are appreciated by the system of performance appraisal. In a 
general context our EXPT variable may be associated with the local prevalence of 
active human resource (HR) management, whereby competence and training may be 
seen as an integrated part of the compensation scheme (e.g., Lado and Wilson, 
1994). At this point our results therefore suggest that individual achievements and 
rewards are balanced by a competency-based view on HR management, as evident 
through high scores for the EXPT variable. 
 
However, just as important as attributes relating to competence and expertise are 
issues of organisational and leadership confidence, according to our results. The 
index variable for trust and identity (TRID) takes a positive, sizeable and precisely 
estimated coefficient. Interestingly, this coefficient does not show significant 
variation between leaders and employees, suggesting that the role of trust and 
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identity issues represents a general mechanism. Our results at this point are in line 
with previous studies (e.g., Gebris and Ihrke, 2000; Reinke, 2003; Kuvaas, 2006), 
who also find that the level of trust between employees and their leaders is an 
important predictor for the acceptance of performance appraisal systems. 
 
Finally, our estimated model for performance appraisal perception approval is 
supportive of the hypothesis that extensive HSE concerns tend to suppress the 
acceptance of prevailing systems of performance appraisal. One possible explanation 
is that merit-oriented leaders and employees see HSE regulations as an impediment 
to their pursuit of performance, creating a wedge between their performance 
appraisal and their personal undisturbed potential. A complementary explanation is 
that HSE concerns are especially far-reaching for industrial, blue-collar workers, for 
example in offshore oil and gas activities. These parts of the organisation are also 
characterised by a high degree of collective bargaining, leaving less room for 
individual performance appraisal. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the 
negative relationship can not be re-produced for our sub-sample of leaders. 
 
In a wider context, career opportunities may be seen as a part of an expanded system 
of performance appraisal, with a more forward-looking allusion (Prendergast, 1999). 
We therefore re-estimate the same model as presented for performance appraisal 
acceptance, but now with perceived career opportunities (COP) as the dependent 
variable. Results are presented in Table 4. There is a gender difference also in this 
model, but not among leaders. Female employees, on the other hand, report a 
somewhat higher degree of satisfaction with their career opportunities than men. 
However, whether this is a reflection of differences in ambitions or differences in 
real opportunities can not be determined by our results. Not surprisingly, personal 
fulfilment in terms of career opportunities is negatively influenced by length of 
service with the company. Note that the effect of seniority is smaller among leaders 
than for employees. Moreover, the significant difference for employees occurs when 
they pass three years of experience, with only a small additional effect for the old-
timers. For leaders, the effect of passing the 3-year threshold is smaller than for 
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employees, and there is also a somewhat larger additional effect for the old-timers in 
our sub-sample of leaders. 
 
Table 4. Estimated perception of career opportunities (CO model) 
Ordered probit estimates obtained with Stata 9.0 
 Full sample Leaders Employees 
 Estimated coefficients a) 
Gender (F)     0.076
***  0.034 
(0.001) (0.581) 
   0.091*** 
(0.000) 
Seniority 1    -0.313
*** 
(0.000) 
-0.121 
(0.273) 
   -0.345*** 
(0.000) 
Seniority 2    -0.347
*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.193* 
(0.062) 
   -0.389*** 
(0.000) 
CHNG    -0.254
*** 
(0.000) 
   -0.291*** 
(0.000) 
   -0.250*** 
(0.000) 
EXPT     0.886
*** 
(0.000) 
    0.938*** 
(0.000) 
    0.876*** 
(0.000) 
TRID     0.410*** (0.000)     0.536
*** 
(0.000) 
    0.386*** 
(0.000) 
HSEC     0.223
*** 
(0.000) 
    0.322*** 
(0.000) 
   0.215*** 
(0.000) 
 Model diagnostics   
  7742.19*** 
       (0.000) 
 1103.54*** χ2 ( )     (0.000)    6483.85
*** 
       (0.000) 
Pseudo R2      0.21    0.21      0.21 
Obs (#) 12623 1957 10666 
 
*)   Significant at 90, **) 95 and  ***) 99 per cent confidence level, respectively. 
a)   p-values in brackets. 
 
Interestingly, we see that the CHNG variable takes a significantly negative 
coefficient, both for leaders and for employers in non-managerial positions. This is 
also an indication that for the parts of the organisation characterised by restructuring 
and rapid change, potential rewards in terms of career opportunities tend to be 
dominated by personal non-economic costs relating to job-insecurity and challenges 
and stress (King, 2000).10 
 
As for the PA model, the dimensions of expertise (EXPT) and trust (TRID) also exert 
a clearly positive influence on perceived career opportunities (COP). All parameters 
are highly significant in statistical terms. In terms of magnitude, the estimated 
coefficients for expertise and competence (EXPT) are nearly twice the size of the 
coefficients for trust and identity (TRID). The role of expertise is robust across 
leaders and employees. Through internal self-selection, individuals who the relation 
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between competence and performance should tend to bunch up in business units and 
departments that accommodate this inclination. As emphasized by previous studies 
of the impact of active HR management (e.g., Lado and Wilson, 1994), our results 
clearly suggest that a predilection for proficiency has a reward in terms of career 
opportunities, not only among leaders, but also for their employees. 
 
Trust and identity (TRID) is also important for perceptions of career opportunities, 
according to our results. Again, the estimated coefficients are positive, sizeable, and 
highly significant in statistical terms. Recall that this variable captures trust both in 
the immediate leader as well as corporate management. In principle, it therefore 
covers both relationship-based trust and the character-based perspective of trust, 
which is especially relevant for more distant leaders than one’s immediate superior 
(Dirks and Ferrin, 2002). However, there is reason to believe that the relationship-
based perspective is dominating in the evaluation of career opportunities, and our 
results should be interpreted accordingly. The estimated model clearly suggests that 
perceived career opportunities among leaders and employees are strongly influenced 
by leadership qualities associated with trust. 
 
Finally, it might seem somewhat puzzling that the impact of HSE concerns (HSEC) 
actually changes sign between our two model specifications for performance 
appraisal. A HSE-oriented work environment is negative for the content with 
performance appraisal systems (PA), at least for employees. On the other hand, the 
same variable exerts a positive influence on perceived career opportunities. This 
positive effect is especially strong for leaders, and we take this as a reflection of the 
inclusion of HSE results in the performance contracts of leaders in Statoil. Along the 
same lines of thought, we may see the positive connection between HSE awareness 
and career opportunities for employees as a manifestation of the stated objective that 
health, safety and environmental should be an important part of the mindset of 
anyone who wants to make her career with Statoil. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
 
The interest in human capital management has increased over the last 10 years, 
reflecting both shortages and increased value-creating potential for human resources, 
skills and competence. Important reasons behind this development include strong 
employment growth in the OECD area, especially in skill-intensive industries. To 
attract and develop talents for key positions and leadership, individual incentive 
schemes and performance-based remuneration has become increasing popular 
throughout private industries, and recently also in public enterprise.  
 
Based on a powerful and unique set of survey data, this study provides robust 
empirical explanations for perceptions regarding performance appraisal and career 
opportunities among leaders and employees in an international oil and gas company 
in Western Europe. An econometric model for categorical choice is specified and 
estimated, with historical and forward-looking performance appraisal as dependent 
variables. The models are estimated for the full sample of responders, with 
supplementary model versions for sub-samples of leaders and employees without 
leadership responsibilities, respectively. 
 
In terms of results, we find a significant gender effect in perceived performance 
appraisal, as men generally tend to report a larger gap between efforts and rewards 
than women. We also find that the perceived gap between efforts and rewards to 
increase with time of service, especially for people without leadership 
responsibilities. Moreover, we find that various properties and characteristics of the 
local working environment are decisive for perceptions of performance appraisal and 
career opportunities, both for leaders and their employees. Parts of the organisation 
with exposure to competitive markets, agility and performance pressures report a 
somewhat higher alignment of efforts and rewards than more sheltered parts of the 
organisation. The same alignment is more prevalent in organisational units 
characterised by a significant pace of change than in stable and stagnant part of the 
organisation. On the other hand, career opportunities seem to be negatively affected 
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by restructuring and change, especially among leaders. In line with previous 
literature, we find the functioning of performance appraisal systems to depend 
positively on trust and identity issues, whereas high HSE concerns in the local 
working environment seem to increase the perceived gap between efforts and 
rewards.  
 
In terms of strategy and policy implications, our results may prove useful in several 
aspects. A reasonable assumption is that an objective of human resource 
management would be to minimise the gap between expected and realised rewards, 
and to align the balance between individual performance and personal appraisal Our 
results suggest that such imbalances are a larger problem among men than among 
women. Moreover, perceived gratification seems to fall with time of service, 
especially among employees without management responsibilities. In a similar 
fashion, the estimated influence of various characteristics of the local working 
environment also provides indications for how to allocate management resources 
across the organisation. As an example, the perceived gap between efforts and 
rewards is higher in sheltered parts of the organisation than in organisational units 
marked by competitive performance. 
 
The present study has identified some important drivers for the perception of 
performance appraisal systems. At the same time, certain shortcomings are still 
implied by limitations of our data and scope of research. First, the data set of our 
study is purely cross-sectional. A potential route for further sophistication would be 
to study survey data over several years, ideally speaking with time series for each 
individual. This would allow the study of how perceptions of performance appraisal 
may change over time, due to changes in explanatory variables and other exogenous 
shocks at the individual, organisational, company or industry level. Second, our 
investigation is limited to perceptions regarding the gap between efforts and rewards. 
Data for actual outcomes in terms of efforts and performance appraisal at the 
individual level would allow us to study the variation between perceived and actual 
performance appraisal. These are issues left for future research. 
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2 This is reflected in the following statement by the Board of Governors: “It is a matter of principle for 
Statoil to be competitive in the labour market without being a pacesetter on pay. The group wants to 
reward and recognise equally results achieved and how they are achieved. It must also ensure that a link 
exists between performance and pay, and a balance between immediate and long-term contributions and 
results. Opportunities for increased remuneration must be accompanied by higher performance 
requirements along all these axes. An important goal for Statoil’s remuneration system is to develop the 
community of interest between the group’s employees and its owners. This is also taken care of by 
setting clear limits to the rewards which the various schemes can provide.” (press release, 15 November 
2006; http://www.statoilhydro.com). 
3 Observe that Statoil’s Global People Survey 2006 was designed and conducted by the company itself, 
without our influence or interaction. Our point of departure is formed by the questionnaire and the 
individual responses. 
4 In a theoretical model, Brouwer (2005) also argues that self-selection is a potential source for this kind 
of systematic difference between entrepreneurial and beuraucratic firms, whereby assertive and bold 
individuals (risk-lovers) seek opportunities with entrepreneurial firms, whereas mindful and unsure 
individuals (risk-haters) tend to pursue a career with more beuraucratic firms or organisations. 
5 Observe, however, that the direction of the effect of a change in x (z) is unambiguously determined by 
the sign of β (γ ) only for the probabilities of the worst score ( p( y = 1 | x, z )) and the top score 
( p( y = 6 | x, z )). For intermediate scores (2, 3, 4, and 5), the sign of partial effects is not uniquely 
determined by the sign of the coefficients. However, the model can be applied for prediction, whereby 
the role of exogenous variables is explored for each outcome by comparative analyses. Specifically, 
estimates of expected outcomes can be compared for various levels of the explanatory variables to obtain 
partial effects for each of the outcomes. 
6 For comparison, OLS estimates are presented in Appendix 2. Some coefficients show minor variation 
when compared to the ordered probit model, but all signs and overall results are the same. We take this as 
an indication of robustness of our econometric analysis.  
7 To test for the influence of intragroup correlation, preliminary estimations were run with clustered 
standard errors for a range of background variables. However, the significance of our estimated effects 
shows robustness to these alternative estimation procedures. To keep things simple, we therefore stick to 
the simple version of standard errors in our presented calculation of p-values. 
8 This pseudo R2 measure is computed because there is no direct equivalent of a traditional R 22 (from OLS 
regression) in non-linear models like the ordered probit model. Compared to standard econometric on 
time series data, our pseudo R2 estimates may seem to indicate weak statistical fit. However, this level of 
statistical fit is not uncommon for non-linear models of discrete choice in cross-sectional data. As noted 
by Wooldridge (2003), goodness of fit is not as important as statistical and economic significance of the 
variables in this class of models. 
9 On the other hand, Sweeney and McFarlin (1997) also argue that women are more concerned with 
procedural justice than men.  
10 Observe also that the concept of career success may vary between leaders and employees in non-
managerial positions (Hennequin, 2007). 
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Appendix 1. Average scores for dependent variables 
 
Performance Appraisal Perception (PAP) 
 
 Seniority 1 
( < 3 years ) 
Seniority 2 
( 3-10  years ) 
Seniority 3 
( > 10  years )  Total 
Full sample (N = 12,368)    
Men 4.198 3.989 3.963 4.007 
Women 4.434 4.203 4.101 4.192 
All 4.268 4.051 3.998 4.057 
     
Leaders    
Men 4.473 4.496 4.471 4.477 
Women 4.529 4.763 4.601 4.635 
All 4.493 4.557 4.497 4.511 
     
Employees    
Men 4.179 3.909 3.821 3.911 
Women 4.424 4.142 4.009 4.129 
All 4.251 3.979 3.873 3.973 
 
 
Career opportunities (COP) 
 
 Seniority 1 
( < 3 years ) 
Seniority 2 
( 3-10  years ) 
Seniority 3 
( > 10  years )  Total 
Full sample (N = 12,623)    
Men 4.809 4.367 4.329 4.416 
Women 4.870 4.494 4.398 4.518 
All 4.828 4.404 4.347 4.444 
     
Leaders    
Men 4.955 4.725 4.771 4.769 
Women 4.694 4.838 4.783 4.787 
All 4.861 4.751 4.773 4.774 
     
Employees    
Men 4.800 4.311 4.206 4.344 
Women 4.884 4.458 4.328 4.482 
All 4.826 4.355 4.239 4.384 
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Appendix 2. Estimated perception of performance appraisal  
 
OLS estimates obtained with Stata 9.0 
 
 Full sample Leaders Employees 
 Estimated coefficients a) 
Intercept    -0.383
***   -0.501** 
(0.000) (0.031) 
   -0.302*** 
(0.000) 
Female      0.092
*** 
(0.000) 
     0.160*** 
(0.001) 
     0.091*** 
(0.000) 
Seniority 1 ( 3 - 10 yrs) -0.018 (0.465) 
    0.229*** 
(0.005) 
  -0.056** 
(0.037) 
Seniority 2 (> 10 yrs)    -0.051
*** 
(0.029) 
 0.131* 
(0.084) 
   -0.093*** 
(0.000) 
CHNG     0.462
*** 
(0.000) 
    0.322*** 
(0.000) 
    0.483*** 
(0.000) 
EXPT     0.368
*** 
(0.000) 
    0.371*** 
(0.000) 
    0.361*** 
(0.000) 
TRID     0.286*** (0.000)     0.371
*** 
(0.000) 
    0.260*** 
(0.000) 
HSEC    -0.087
*** 
(0.000) 
  -0.061** 
(0.234) 
   -0.089*** 
(0.000) 
 Model diagnostics   
   1451.66*** 
       (0.000)
   162.47*** F ( ) 
    (0.000)
   1215.11*** 
       (0.000) 
R2      0.45    0.37      0.45 
RMSE      0.90    0.85      0.91 
Obs (#) 12368 1950 10418 
 
*)   Significant at 90, **) 95 and  ***) 99 per cent confidence level, respectively. 
a)   p-values in brackets. 
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Appendix 3. Estimated perception of career opportunities  
 
OLS estimates obtained with Stata 9.0 
 
 Full sample Leaders Employees 
 Estimated coefficients a) 
Intercept -0.011    -0.489
*** 
(0.844) (0.004) 
   0.096*** 
(0.122) 
Female     0.066
*** 
(0.000) 
0.030 
(0.493) 
   0.076*** 
(0.000) 
Seniority 1 ( 3 - 10 yrs)    -0.194
*** 
(0.000) 
-0.037 
(0.631) 
   -0.214*** 
(0.000) 
Seniority 2 (> 10 yrs)    -0.217
*** 
(0.000) 
-0.062 
(0.387) 
   -0.243*** 
(0.000) 
CHNG    -0.214
*** 
(0.000) 
   -0.244*** 
(0.000) 
   -0.210*** 
(0.000) 
EXPT      0.738
*** 
(0.000) 
     0.723*** 
(0.000) 
     0.738*** 
(0.000) 
TRID      0.339*** (0.000)      0.422
*** 
(0.000) 
     0.324*** 
(0.000) 
HSEC     0.151
*** 
(0.000) 
    0.190*** 
(0.000) 
     0.146*** 
(0.000) 
 Model diagnostics   
   1586.43*** 
       (0.000)
   223.90*** F ( ) 
    (0.000)
   1315.37*** 
       (0.000) 
R2      0.47    0.45      0.46 
RMSE      0.85    0.79      0.86 
Obs (#) 12623 1957 10666 
 
*)   Significant at 90, **) 95 and  ***) 99 per cent confidence level, respectively. 
a)   p-values in brackets. 
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